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Abstract
Information processing in groups has long been seen as a cooperative process. In contrast with this assump-
tion, group members were rarely found to behave cooperatively: They withhold unshared information
and stick to initial incorrect decisions. In the present article, we examined how group members’ cooper-
ative and competitive motives impact on group information processing and propose that information shar-
ing and use in groups could be seen as strategic behavior. We reviewed the latest developments in the
literature investigating different forms of strategic information processing and their underlying mecha-
nisms. This review suggests that explicit cooperative goals are needed for effective group decision-making.
When complex problems are to be solved, groups are often used to make decisions. Juries de-
cide about the guilt of an alleged murderer, selection panels about the best candidate for a new
position, industrial executive panels about the development of a new factory, and boards of
managers about future business plans. One reason for using groups is that its members should
possess a larger pool of information, knowledge, and skills than a single person, which is likely
to lead to more informed decisions. This ideal perspective on the role of groups has had a strong
inf luence on the research conducted for the last 25years in the area of group decision-making
( for a review, see Stasser & Titus, 2003), developed on the assumption that group members
work cooperatively when making decisions (Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004).
The present article reconsiders this classic cooperative assumption and reviews recent literature
suggesting that group decision-making situations involve a mixture of cooperative and compet-
itive motives that affect the extent to which members share and use their information.
Information Sharing and Use in Group Decision-Making
Group decision-making ref lects group-level information processing (Hinsz, Tindale, &
Vollrath, 1997) that involves both information sharing and information use. Information sharing
refers to the pooling of all informational resources that group members possess, which can be
shared information, namely information known to all group members, and unshared informa-
tion, namely information known only by one or some group members (Stasser & Titus, 1985).
Unshared information is the key element that allows groups to reach decisions of superior qual-
ity, as compared to individual decision, if their members share this information (Stasser & Titus,
2003): Indeed, pooling unshared information allows the group to work with a body of infor-
mation which is larger than that of each single member. Research on information pooling,
however, has repeatedly shown that groupmembers pool and repeat more shared than unshared
information, a phenomenon called information-sampling bias (Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987; for a
meta-analysis, see Lu, Yuan, & McLeod, 2012). This bias has been mainly attributed to the su-
perior probability of shared information to be mentioned during discussions, because directly© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Hanna, 1989). For example, in a three-member group, shared information can be mentioned
three times, while unshared information only once. However, another recent meta-analysis
on information exchange conducted by Reimer, Reimer, and Czienskowski (2010) revealed
that the bias in favor of shared information is only half the value predicted by the probability-
sampling model. Another explanation for the information-sampling bias relies on the notion
that shared information appears more valuable than unshared information because all members
in the groups possess it (Wittenbaum, Hubbell, & Zuckerman, 1999).
Groups are not only poor at sharing their information, but also at processing the available in-
formation. Research has found that even when all pieces of information are discussed, group
members still have difficulties in making the best decision (Mojzisch, Grouneva, & Schulz-
Hardt, 2010). Two biases in the evaluation of information have been identified in the literature.
First, people evaluate their own information more favorably than others’ information (an effect
called “ownership bias”; Van Swol, Savadori, & Sniezek, 2003). For example, in one study with
real group discussion, participants judged their own discussed unshared information as more
important than others’ discussed unshared information (Chernyshenko, Miner, Baumann, &
Sniezek, 2003). In another study, participants rated the information received before the group
discussion (own information) as more valid than the information received during the discussion
(others’ information; Van Swol et al., 2003).
Second, when considering others’ information, people evaluate more positively information
that is consistent, rather than inconsistent, with their initial preference (an effect called “prefer-
ence effect”; Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003). People also tend to discuss more often the
information that is consistent with their initial decision (Mojzisch et al., 2010). One reason is
that consistent information is more salient and more readily accessible from memory than
inconsistent information (Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003). More recently, Faulmüller,
Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt (2010) argued that sharedness and preference for
consistent information are often confounded in group decision-making situations, which leads
to a preference-consistent information sharing. Both the ownership bias and the preference
effect were found to be responsible for poor decisions quality (Greitemeyer & Schulz-
Hardt, 2003; Toma, Bry, & Butera, 2013), beyond unshared information pooling (Toma &
Butera, 2009).
Notwithstanding the wealth of research on information processing in groups, an important
question remains: If group members are motivated to cooperate, with the aim of reaching the
best possible decision, why would they neglect crucial unshared information and display such
egocentric biases as the ownership bias and the preference effect? The aim of this article is to
shed new light on these phenomena using recent experimental research that provides evidence
that information sharing and use in groups do not necessarily ref lect biases in information
processing but rather deliberate and strategic behavior.From Cooperation to Mixed-Motives in Group Decision-Making
Previous research provided important insights regarding the role of information processing in
group decision-making (e.g., Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Stasser & Stewart,
1992; Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995; Stasser & Titus, 2003; Stewart & Stasser, 1998),
but very little of this research integrated the role of motivation. More recently, theoretical con-
tributions (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008; Nijstad & De Dreu, 2012; Toma,
Vasiljevic, Oberlé, Augustinova, & Butera 2012) and empirical research (Toma & Butera,
2009; Steinel, Utz, & Koning, 2010) suggested that the assumption that groups cooperate in
decision-making is not warranted, and that cooperative and competitive motives might co-exist© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/9 (2015): 455–467, 10.1111/spc3.12191
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incentives to reach high-quality group decisions, as well as competitive incentives to do well
personally, to attain a high status, or to prove their competence. Within the same group, some
members may be motivated by cooperation and act in the interest of the group, while other
members may be motivated by competition and only act in their own interest. For example,
within a board of managers who must decide about future business plans, some managers will
share the available information, while others might hide information disclosing personal inter-
ests (e.g., information supporting a specific solution if that solution implies that he/she would
make less money). Given the complexity of the social settings that decision-making groups of-
ten face, some authors have proposed that earlier findings ref lect mixed-motives rather than
purely cooperative situations (Wittenbaum et al., 2004).
In particular, the Motivated Information Processing in Groups model (MIP-G; De Dreu
et al., 2008) was developed to shed light on the role of different motivations in groups and ex-
pands the view of groups as information processors (Hinsz et al., 1997) to groups as motivated
information processors. The model states that information processing in groups is driven by two
orthogonal motivations, namely epistemic and social motivations. Epistemic motivation refers
to individuals’ “willingness to expend effort to achieve a thorough, rich and accurate under-
standing of the world, including the group task or decision problem at hand” (De Dreu et al.,
2008, p. 23). Social motivation refers to “individual preference for outcome distributions be-
tween oneself and other group members” (De Dreu et al., 2008, p. 23). Epistemic motivation
inf luences the depth of information processing, while social motivation inf luences the various
biases in information processing (De Dreu et al., 2008). Because the aim of the present article is
to provide evidence that biases in information sharing and use can be viewed as strategic behav-
ior, we will now focus on social motivations.
Social motivation is driven by both dispositional and situational variables. On the one hand, it
is captured by individual differences in social value orientation (Messick & McClintock, 1968;
Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), ref lecting group members’ preference in re-
sources allocation between self and others, which can vary from pro-social (members are inter-
ested to enhance joint resources) to pro-self (members are interested to enhance their relative
advantage over others’ resources). Social motivation is also captured by individual differences
in achievement goals, in particular performance goals (Harackiewicz & Sansone, 1991). More
specifically, group members pursuing performance-approach goals strive to demonstrate their
superiority by outperforming others (Dweck, 1986) and to show that they are right while others
are wrong (Sommet et al., 2014), whereas members pursuing performance-avoidance goals try
to avoid being inferior to others (Elliot & McGregor, 2001) and seek consensus with others
(Sommet et al., 2014).
On the other hand, social motivation can also be induced by situational cues like positive or
negative goal interdependence ( Johnson & Johnson, 1989), collective versus individual incen-
tives like rewarding the whole group or only some members (Pearsall, Christian, & Ellis, 2010;
Hayek, Toma, Oberlé, & Butera, 2014), or by explicit instructions to cooperate or to compete
(De Dreu et al., 2008). According to the MIP-G model, members who are motivated by
cooperation should process information in a way that serves collective interests and the group’s
goal of making the best decision possible. On the contrary, members who are motivated by
competition should process information in a way that fosters individual outcomes. For example,
members motivated by competition should exchange less information contradicting their
preferences and should react defensively when their own decisions are questioned (see also
Nijstad & De Dreu, 2012). In the remainder of this article, we will thus report research that
supports the hypothesis that groups members share and use information as a function of their
motivations.© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/9 (2015): 455–467, 10.1111/spc3.12191
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From hidden proﬁles to information pooling games
The hidden profiles (Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987) have been extensively employed to investi-
gate information sharing in groups. In this paradigm, group members need to decide among a
series of alternatives (e.g., suspects in a murder), but each member is given only part of the in-
formation available about each alternative. The key pieces of information are given to different
members (unshared information), while other pieces of information are given to all members
(shared information). For this reason, shared information usually supports a different, inferior al-
ternative than unshared information, which supports a superior alterative when discussed in
groups. These are important features of the hidden profile paradigm, as they make sharing in-
formation necessary to reaching the optimal decision. For example, a group of three members
has to decide who, among four suspects, is the person responsible for a road accident. Based on
his/her unshared information, one group member decides that the guilty person is Mrs. Y.
However, another group member has the information that the guilty person is a man, which
invalidates the Mrs. Y solution. Based on his/her unshared information, this second group
member decides that the guilty person is Mr. X, who is 53years old. However, the third group
member has the information that the guilty person is less than 30years old, which invalidates the
Mr. X solution. In the end, this group can decide who is the real guilty person (Mr. X’s son)
only if they pool their unshared information and eliminate all the suboptimal alternatives.
Most of previous studies using this paradigm assumed that group members cooperate toward
the common goal of making the best group decision and therefore they should pool their infor-
mation, and especially unshared information. In other words, it was expected that because
members must cooperate and share their information, that they would necessarily behave that
way (Wittenbaum et al., 2004). However, most studies using hidden profiles found that group
members pooled less unshared than shared information and made decisions of poor quality ( for
a review, Lu et al., 2012). This suggests that group members failed to work cooperatively in a
task that strongly required cooperation and information sharing. Although many valid explana-
tions were proposed to account for this effect (such as sampling advantage of shared information
[Stasser & Titus, 1985], preference for consistent information [Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt
(2003)], and mutual enhancement [Wittenbaum et al., 1999]), previous research overlooked
that information sharing in groups could ref lect deliberate behavior inf luenced by members’
goals.
For this reason, several authors proposed that unshared information neglect might also be
understood by taking into account the cooperative and competitive goals underlying this task
(De Dreu et al., 2008; Nijstad & De Dreu, 2012). The mere fact that hidden profiles imply
cooperation does not mean that group members always act cooperatively (Wittenbaum et al.,
2004). If group members are motivated by competition, which is a likely circumstance as
discussed earlier, they should restrain the access to their valuable information, namely to un-
shared information.
Toma and Butera (2009) investigated this idea in a study with three-person groups who had
to solve a hidden profile. They manipulated cooperative and competitive motives by telling
participants either that their goal was to make the best decision as a group or to make the best
decision as individual members. Participants were told in advance which information was shared
and which information was unshared, a procedure that allowed to test whether information
sharing ref lects strategic behavior. Results showed that members in competition pooled less
valuable, unshared information than members in cooperation, while no difference was found
for shared information. Interestingly, the fact that members in competition pooled as much© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/9 (2015): 455–467, 10.1111/spc3.12191
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trigger others’ cooperation and the unveiling of their unshared information.
More recently, researchers claimed that some hidden profiles and, more generally, the situa-
tions of information exchange share some features of social dilemmas (e.g.,Kimmerle,
Wodzicki, Jarodzka, & Cress, 2011). Indeed, both in social dilemmas and in hidden profiles,
collective interests could be at odds with private interests. For example, in some hidden profiles,
members are made aware that information sharing serves collective interests but also individual
ones (see below explanations about the information pooling game). If in those hidden profiles
group members are motivated by competition (e.g., a member supports a decision alternative
that favors him personally), it is tempting and convenient to use others’ unshared information
without contributing one’s own unshared information. In this way, members avoid losing their
competitive advantage, they spend less time and effort, and take advantage of other members’
willingness to behave cooperatively and to share information (Kimmerle et al., 2011). Like in
traditional social dilemmas, in those hidden profiles, group members are facing a situation in
which it is always more self-advantageous in the short term to withhold information than to
share it, which corresponds to a strategic behavior.
However, the hidden profile paradigm is not the perfect tool to test the strategic information
processing prediction (Steinel et al., 2010). Among the limitations of this paradigm, the most
problematic is that in hidden profiles, it is difficult to make a distinction between strategic
withholding of unshared information and its neglect for other reasons (e.g., because it simply
goes against people’s initial preferences). Another issue is that in hidden profiles, groupmembers
are generally unaware of the information that needs to be shared to make a good decision
( for an exception, see Toma&Butera, 2009). Imagine a group of three friends whomust decide
which between two locations (Paris or London) is the best for their vacations. All members
know six positive arguments about Paris (shared information), but each member knows three
positive arguments about London (unshared information). If members share all the information,
London would objectively be a better location (because the positive arguments would sum
up to nine). However, if members are unaware that they posses unshared information, they
might end up in choosing Paris for their vacation. To overcome this problem, Steinel et al.
(2010) developed the information pooling game that incorporates one important feature of
social dilemmas, namely that members are made aware that information sharing could serve
both collective and individual interests. More specifically, in this paradigm, participants are
told which information is shared and which is unshared, and also which information is
important and which information is unimportant. In that way, game group members who
want to behave strategically should avoid mentioning accurate unshared and important
information.
Forms of strategic information sharing
Because sharedness and importance are key characteristics of information, this new paradigm al-
lows measuring various forms of strategic information sharing. Steinel et al. (2010) tested this
idea by comparing group members with pro-self and pro-social motivations who played an in-
formation pooling game.More specifically, participants had to take photos of celebrities but had
to share their limited information about when and where those celebrities will show up. Partic-
ipants were rewarded for the number of pictures taken as a group (pro-socials) or as individuals
(pro-selfs). Overall, pro-selfs shared less information than pro-socials, which is consistent with
social dilemmas research showing that pro-socials contribute more to public good than pro-selfs
(De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999). Pro-selfs also pooled less unshared information and less impor-
tant information than pro-socials and lied more than pro-socials, especially about unshared
information. Pro-selfs distorted both important and unimportant information, probably in an© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/9 (2015): 455–467, 10.1111/spc3.12191
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that individuals driven by competitive motives behave more strategically than individuals with
cooperative motives, as the former predominantly pool shared and unimportant information
and withhold valuable and unshared information, be it important or unimportant.
The above-mentioned study suggests that group members are strategic when sharing their in-
formation because they know exactly what is the value of information for themselves and others.
More direct evidence supporting this idea comes from a study conducted by Kimmerle et al.
(2011). They developed an information exchange dilemma in which participants had the possi-
bility to inf luence the value of self and others’ information. They found that all participants
avoided contributing information that would help others to obtain a higher benefit than the ben-
efit they gained themselves, but this was especially pronounced for participants with a pro-self
orientation. One explanation of this effect is that for pro-selfs, information is a source of power
(Webster et al., 2008), and therefore, giving information of high value to others would be of high
cost for themselves. This is in line with field studies showing that in organizations, competition
leads employers to strategically distort their most valuable information (Mitusch, 2006).
Strategic information sharing also occurs when people distort their own information and
exploit the accurate information provided by others. For example, in a situation of problem
solving in dyads (Winter Survival Exercise –WSE), participants were asked to individually rank
12 items of information that were helpful in solving the problem. Then, they had to exchange
information about their ranking with another participant. Participants who pursued competitive
goals like aiming to outperform others (i.e., performance-approach goals) were less open to pro-
vide their true ranking to their partner than were participants who were simply motivated to do
well on the task (i.e.,mastery goals) (Poortvliet, Janssen, Van Yperen, & Van de Vliert, 2007). In
addition, participants with performance-approach goals also used the high-quality information
received from their partners, more than participants with mastery goals.
Sometimes, when people are motivated to engage in strategic information sharing, they do
not just hide or lie about valuable information, but they also engage in behaviors that are directly
targeted to harm others’ performance. In another WSE problem-solving task, individuals
instructed to pursue performance goals were less willing than individuals with mastery goals
to share accurate information, but also more willing to use thwarting behavior: They choose
to administer a loud noise that prevented their partners to solve the problem (Poortvliet, Anseel,
Janssen, Van Yperen, & Van de Vliert, 2012).
An interesting, and yet understudied, facet of strategic information sharing refers to how
much the competence or the expertise of the partner is taken into account. Logically, a compe-
tent partner should be considered as a reliable source of information, which should in turn fa-
cilitate information sharing. However, a great deal of research has shown that expert partners
may also be considered as threatening opponents, when their competence is likely to question
one’s own competence (e.g.,Butera &Mugny, 2001; Quiamzade &Mugny, 2009). For exam-
ple, when a patient’s diagnosis is hard to make, several doctors discuss the case in order to reach
the best decision for the patient. During group discussions, some members might try to impose
their point of view because they want to look smart and powerful. To this aim, they need to use
subtle forms of deception, more so when interacting with high competent than with low com-
petent partners. This is what Poortvliet et al. (2012) found in a second study: The level of com-
petence of the exchange partner inf luenced the quality of information shared by the
participants with competitive goals – they gave more blatantly inaccurate information to low
competent than to high competent partners.
The partner’s level of competence is thus an indicator of howmuch deception one could use,
but also of how threatening the interaction could be. This latter situation can be encountered
when group members are explicitly declared experts and have high competitive incentives© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/9 (2015): 455–467, 10.1111/spc3.12191
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pharmaceutical companies). Expertise is considered a major resource, vital to the group’s success
(Bottger & Yetton, 1988), but it could also lead to negative effects if experts simply want to look
smarter than others, as is the case in competitive situations. In a recent study using a hidden
profile (Toma, Vasiljevic, Oberlé, & Butera, 2013), members were – or were not – explicitly
declared experts and were instructed to pursue either competitive or cooperative goals
(e.g., make the best decision for the group or for themselves). The results showed that group
members who were declared experts and pursued competitive goals pooled and repeated even
less unshared information than members who were not declared experts (Toma et al., 2013).
This suggests that competitive motives counteract and even reverse the well-known positive
effects of expertise on information sharing (Stasser et al., 1995). Expertise was only beneficial
for information sharing only when group members pursued cooperative goals.
Underlying mechanisms of strategic information sharing
At this point, one might wonder why people behave strategically when motivated by compe-
tition. What are the underlying mechanisms that could explain the above-mentioned effects?
One explanation is that competition leads people to mistrust other group members. Defined
as the unwillingness to risk vulnerability to a person whose behavior is beyond one’s control,
mistrust (or fear of being exploited) is a good reason to engage in deceptive behavior. For
example, fear of being exploited was found to be responsible for the withholding of accurate
information in social decision-making (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004) and for the withholding of
unshared information in hidden profiles (Toma & Butera, 2009).
Competition thus activates the fear of being exploited, but also the desire to exploit other peo-
ple. Accordingly, Poortvliet et al. (2007) found that individuals pursuing performance-approach
goals develop a strong exploitation orientation that explains why they share little valuable infor-
mation and make use of the high-quality information obtained from others. Moreover, greed –
which is also related to exploitative intentions – explains why people provide inaccurate
information to others in an information provision game (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). In all infor-
mation exchange situations, competition activates tactical deception tendencies aimed at
maintaining a positive self in other people’s eyes. Indeed, Poortvliet et al. (2012) also showed that
participants wanted to be seen as trustworthy, informed and competent, because in this way their
partners can be convinced that the information they received was indeed valuable and accurate.
Competition also makes people more focused on standing out in the comparison of compe-
tences with others (Butera & Mugny, 2001). For example, when experts are in competition
with other experts, they want to prove that others’ competence is inferior to their own
(Quiamzade & Mugny, 2009), and indeed, the devaluation of others’ competence was found
to be responsible for the negative effects of expertise and competition on unshared information
pooling and repetitions (Toma, Gilles, & Butera, 2013). In other words, experts’ competence is
threatened when in competition, and therefore, they tend to hinder others’ competence by de-
liberately neglecting to mention valuable information.
To sum up, recent research provided convincing evidence that when group members are
motivated by competition, they fear and denigrate their fellow members and thereby use vari-
ous deceptive and exploitative strategies to share their information, which is not the case when
members are motivated by cooperation.
Strategic Information Use in Groups
Group members can be strategic not only when sharing information, but also when using infor-
mation received during group discussion. Previous research showed that even when all© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/9 (2015): 455–467, 10.1111/spc3.12191
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this information efficiently (Van Knippenberg, de Dreu, & Homan, 2004). Very often, people
evaluate information received during group discussion in a biased way (Schulz-Hardt, Frey,
Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000): People favor information that is consistent, rather then incon-
sistent, with their initial preference (“preference effect”; Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003)
and evaluate their own information more favorably than others’ information (“ownership bias”;
Van Swol et al., 2003).
Several authors have recently questioned the merely cognitive origin of these biases
(Faulmüller, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Schulz-Hardt, 2012; Toma et al., 2013) and argued that
social motivations could play a central role in understanding why people favor their own infor-
mation and information consistent with their preferences. Members who are motivated by
cooperation should use information in a way that serves collective interests, while members
who are motivated by competition should use information in a way that fosters individual out-
comes (De Dreu et al., 2008). For example, when group members are motivated to convince
others (like in competition) or to be understood by others (like in cooperation) they wish to
get their own preference adopted by the group and therefore process information in a confir-
matory way (Faulmüller et al., 2012). In the next section, we will provide supportive empirical
evidence suggesting that by taking into account people’s cooperative and competitive motiva-
tions, the preference effect and the ownership bias can be seen as strategic behaviors.Forms of strategic information use
The preference effect, also called confirmation bias (Frey & Schulz-Hardt, 2001), is an impor-
tant indicator of information use. Whenever group members put into question their own or
others’ initial preferences, they need to use the available information in order to confirm or dis-
confirm their positions. At the same time, people instantly develop ownership of their ideas and
prefer information that support and confirm them ( for a review, see Frey & Schulz-Hardt,
2001). Recent investigations suggest that the motivation to compete, as opposed to cooperate,
with fellow members can enhance this bias.
There are two arguments supporting the idea that competition enhances the preference ef-
fect. First, competition motivates group members to avoid disconfirming their own preference.
This is because people tend to react defensively when their own preferences are questioned, and
especially with competitive motives (Darnon, Muller, Schrager, Pannuzzo, & Butera, 2006; De
Dreu & van Knippenberg, 2005; Sommet et al., 2014). Second, competition motivates group
members to avoid disconfirming others’ erroneous preferences so as to impede them to find
the correct decision and to keep the competitive advantage. Both effects were found in a study
with real group discussions in which participants had to find the guilty person in a road accident
case (Toma & Butera, 2009). In this study, goal interdependence was manipulated (positive in-
terdependence – i.e., cooperation versus negative interdependence – i.e., competition) and the
number of times groupmembers used a disconfirmation strategy during discussion was counted.
The results showed that the disconfirmation of (one’s own and others’) preferences was lower
under competition than under cooperation, which subsequently reduced decision quality in
the competition condition.
A more direct test of how cooperative and competitive goals inf luence the preference effect
comes from a study by Toma et al. (2013). In this study, participants received a fictitious discus-
sion about a road accident investigation that contained consistent and inconsistent information
with their initial preference. Participants were asked to evaluate this information and to reach a
final decision. Cooperation versus competition and the presence versus absence of dissent
(how diverse were individual members’ preferences) were manipulated. Results showed that© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/9 (2015): 455–467, 10.1111/spc3.12191
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when participants were informed that their preferences were in dissent with others’ preferences
(see also Hayek, Toma, Oberlé, & Butera, 2014). This is because competition reinforces con-
cerns for superiority and differentiation (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004), and confirmation of one’s
own preference is an effective strategy to attain this goal. These results are consistent with the
idea that the motivation to show one is right and others are wrong is responsible for the increase
in confirmation of one’s own preference (Sommet et al., 2014).
People can favor consistent over inconsistent information received during group discussion
simply because consistent information resembles own information. It is nowwidely known that
people evaluate themselves more favorably than others (Brown, 1986) and evaluate own infor-
mation more favorably than others’ information (Chernyshenko et al., 2003). This latter effect
called ownership bias was found to inf luence group-decision quality (Van Swol et al., 2003).
The ownership bias depends on whether others’ information is consistent or inconsistent with
their own. For example, Mojzisch et al. (2010) showed that the quality of own information was
perceived as higher than the quality of others’ information only when this information was con-
sistent with participants’ initial preference. More recently, Toma et al. (2013) suggested that
group members’ cooperative and competitive motives affect the extent to which the ownership
bias occurs for consistent or inconsistent information. In a two-phase decision-making situation,
participants had to reach an initial decision and then they evaluated the value of their own
information, as well as that of others’ consistent and inconsistent information while being
instructed to cooperate or to compete with their fellow members. Participants instructed to
compete judged their own information as more valuable than others’ information, regardless
of whether this information was consistent or inconsistent with initial decisions. Participants
instructed to cooperate judged their own information as more valuable than others’ consistent,
but not inconsistent information. This suggests that cooperation leads people to acknowledge
that others possess information (the inconsistent one) that is as valuable as their own information.
Competition leads people to discard any type of information coming from others. As a conse-
quence, members who competed with each other kept their initial incorrect decisions, while
members who cooperated with others moved toward better decisions.
Underlying mechanisms of strategic information use
The same study directly testedwhether the need to enhance the self is responsible for the above-
mentioned effects in competition. Self-enhancement ref lects strivings to raise one’s positive
self-view and superiority (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). Because competition generally strengthens
these concerns (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004), competition motivates people to use preference con-
firmation as a self-enhancement strategy. Thus, Toma et al. (2013) found that self-enhancement
predicted the use of preference confirmation of members motivated by competition who were
confronted with the dissenting preferences of other group members. Interestingly, when
confronted with members who witnessed a consensus on initial preferences, the same self-
enhancement strategy predicted participants’ propensity to use disconfirmation and to change
their preferences. In other words, seeing that other members support the same preference as
their own makes people motivated by competition changes their mind. This strengthens the
idea that people behave strategically: They can stick to or change their preferences in order to
cope with competition.
Self-enhancement is not the only mechanisms explaining the strategic use of confirmation.
Under competition, confirmation of one’s own initial preference can also serve a protection
function (Butera & Mugny, 1995, 2001), as it allows individuals to be reassured on them being
right, and reduces the fear of being exploited by the competitors (Leyens, Dardenne, Yzerbyt,© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/9 (2015): 455–467, 10.1111/spc3.12191
464 Cooperation, Competition and Group Decision-MakingScaillet, & Snyder, 1999). In line with this idea, mistrust was found to mediate the impact of
competitive (versus cooperative) goals on the use of confirmation during group discussion
(Toma & Butera, 2009). Mistrust and self-enhancement seem to be valid explanations for the
preference confirmation, and perhaps even for the existence of the ownership bias in compet-
itive settings. This suggests that in purely cooperative settings, people should be less biased in
favor of own and consistent information.Conclusions and Future Directions
Information processing in groups has long been seen as a cooperative process. However, group
members were often found to neglect unshared information and to be unable to value others’
information in an unbiased way.We argued that by taking into account group members’ coop-
erative and competitive motives, information sharing and use in groups could be seen as strategic
behavior rather than as biased processing. We reviewed and integrated the latest developments
in the literature investigating different forms and underlying mechanisms of strategic informa-
tion sharing and use in group decision-making. Our analysis suggests that with regard to infor-
mation sharing, group members are more strategic when motivated by competition than by
cooperation: They withhold, lie about, distort, and exploit information because they feel greed
and mistrust toward fellow members.
With regard to information use, group members behave strategically when motivated by
competition as opposed to cooperation. People can confirm or disconfirm their preferences
whenever this helps enhancing the competitive self. The findings reviewed here suggest that
under competitive incentives, information processing is impaired and that cooperation, al-
though not sufficient, is needed for effective group decision-making.
The empirical evidence on which these conclusions are derived comes essentially from ex-
perimental studies with ad-hoc groups performing tasks with relatively low implications for
its members. Therefore, future research should focus on real groups in organizational and edu-
cational settings in which the cooperative and competitive motives could be induced by features
of the relevant context (e.g., norms, time pressure, rewards, and criteria for evaluation). There
has been little research devoted to study how external factors inf luence group members’ moti-
vation and group information processing ( for an exception, see Hayek, Toma, Oberlé & Butera
2015), and we hope that future research will fill this gap.
Another important direction for future research is to investigate the impact of group compo-
sition in terms of pro-social and pro-self motivation. Howmany pro-social members are needed
in a group to induce a cooperative atmosphere? It might be that the answer largely depends on
the position of those particular members (how much they are trusted, admired, and respected).
Previous research suggests that the effect of a particular members’ motivation depends on the
power of that person to inf luence the group (Ten Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu, 2010). How-
ever, this research only investigated the effect of epistemic motivation, and we don’t know
whether the same holds for the social motivation.
It is also important to investigate the joint effect of social and epistemic motivation. Cooper-
ative motives might not always be sufficient to make group members less biased toward shared
and preference-consistent information if they are not accompanied by epistemic motivation
(De Dreu et al., 2008). One way of inducing both motivations is to create intergroup compe-
tition, which should induce higher information processing and better decision quality (Nijstad
& De Dreu, 2012).
We hope that the present reviewwill stimulate further research examining how different forms
of motivation affect strategic information processing beyond the more traditional approaches to
group decision-making.© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9/9 (2015): 455–467, 10.1111/spc3.12191
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